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ABSTRACT 
Awareness of the importance of policy regarding the equitable distribution of global water 
resources is increasing. The purpose of this research study was to investigate the effects of 
allocation rules and drought conditions on allocation decisions through a decision experiment 
based on an idealized river basin that simulated conditions in the Saskatchewan River Basin. 
Participants took on the roles of water managers responsible for allocating water resources to 
four competing sectors in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. Three variations of allocation 
rules were tested: (a) status-quo allocation rules mimicking the current governance structure 
involving prearranged allocation rules across regions, (b) no predetermined rules, and (c) no 
predetermined rules but communication among participants. Each allocation rule was tested 
under two potential water levels: (a) drier-than-average conditions today reflecting 81% of 
historical flows, and (b) severe drought conditions with a 45% reduction from today’s flows. 
Results showed that policy had a significant effect on how participants allocated water resources, 
indicating that the absence of defined minimal flow rules and the lack of communication among 
riparian users resulted in less equitable distribution of water, with negative ramifications for 
downstream users. Additionally, results showed that drought-induced water scarcity significantly 
affected allocation patterns, with participants choosing to protect municipal water use at the 
expense of industry and agriculture in the face of water shortage conditions. For decision makers 
and water stakeholders in the Saskatchewan River Basin, these findings provide insight into the 
effectiveness of the 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment to ensure the equitable 
distribution of water through defined minimum flows and the problem of fragmented governance, 
which prevents effective communication between upstream and downstream users. The findings 
also highlighted the importance of having a formal rule structure to oversee allocations or 
ongoing communication processes to facilitate problem solving in preparation for drought 
conditions. 
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Perspectives on Equitable Water Resource Allocation from a Decision Experiment  
1. Introduction 
The management of freshwater resources across the world faces numerous growing 
challenges, including water scarcity, conflicts over water use and access, and ecosystem 
degradation (Böhmelt et al., 2014; Earle, Jagerskog, & Ojendal, 2010; McCaffrey, 2007; 
Vörösmarty et al., 2010). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) estimates that, globally, 2.8 billion people live in areas experiencing water stress, a 
number estimated to rise to 3.9 billion by 2030 (OECD, 2009). The scale of these issues reflects 
ineffective past management practices and signals the need for a fundamental change in water 
management. Previous actions to mitigate these problems have been more incremental than 
innovative, in part because of inherent conservatism in the water management community (Lach, 
Ingram, & Rayner, 2005).  
This paper examines the water management policies within the Saskatchewan River 
Basin and outlines potential issues for future water security within the provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. In creating an interactive decision experiment, we sought to test if 
alternative policy options would prompt different priorities and methods of adapting to extreme 
water shortages. 
 
1.1 The Saskatchewan River Basin 
The Saskatchewan River Basin is one of the world’s larger river basins, covering 336,000 
km2. Originating in the Canadian Rocky Mountains, snowmelt and glacial runoff flow eastward 
via two main tributaries (the North Saskatchewan and South Saskatchewan rivers) through the 
Prairie Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, with the river basin discharging the 
majority of its water into Lake Winnipeg (Gober & Wheater, 2014; Partners for the 
Saskatchewan River Basin, 2009a; Fig. 1). The Saskatchewan River Basin lies in a dry prairie 
eco-zone, which produces short, warm, dry summers and long, cold, and relatively dry winters. 
This zone is susceptible to large weather and climate extremes, from severe droughts (most 
recently seen in 2001–2002), to severe floods such as those in Saskatchewan in 2011 and Alberta 
in 2013 (Gober & Wheater, 2014; Partners for the Saskatchewan River Basin, 2009a).  
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Fig.1. Saskatchewan River Basin (Partners for the Saskatchewan River Basin, 2015). 
 
Environmental change has begun to alter the natural systems that support life and 
economic activity in the prairies (Wheater & Gober, 2013). A warming climate is altering the 
runoff flows in the Rocky Mountains, affecting the timing and volume of seasonal flows 
(Comeau, Pietroniro, & Demuth, 2009; Demuth & Pietroniro, 2003; Marshall et al., 2011; Moore 
et al., 2009). Additionally, a changing climate raises concerns for new extreme conditions across 
the Prairie Provinces, such as droughts and floods (Bonsal, Aider, Gachon, & Lapp, 2013). One 
concern has been the devastating drought conditions previously seen in the 20th century—during 
the Dust Bowl years of the 1930s (Gober & Wheater, 2014; “Great Depression,” 2015). 
However, these droughts were relatively mild compared to pre-settlement years: paleo-records 
show evidence of extreme, prolonged low-flow and drought conditions in the region (Bonsal et 
al., 2013; Case & Macdonald, 2003). 
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1.2 Current Governance 
 The Prairie Provinces’ governance structure derives from two streams of water law: 
riparian law and allocation licensing. In 1870, the Prairie Provinces adopted riparian law, which 
is based on the principle of equitable use. The principle of equitable use, a defining feature of 
modern water governance, is entrenched in almost all international, regional, and basin-level 
agreements and promotes the fair and sustainable use of water resources among riparian users. 
The principle dictates that the reasonable sharing of water does not entitle equal sharing; instead, 
it allows the concerned riparian bodies to interpret what constitutes reasonable sharing to meet 
various needs and interests (Versteeg, 2007). The 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment, 
signed in 1969, dictates provincial allocations across Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba 
(Partners for the Saskatchewan River Basin, 2009b). This agreement which uses the principle of 
equitable utilization, derived from historic precedents, states that Alberta may use no more than 
half of the natural flow arising in the province and must allow the remainder to pass into 
Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan, then, must use no more than half of the water that flows through 
the province, and allow the remainder to flow to Manitoba (Partners for the Saskatchewan River 
Basin, 2009b). 
The Master Agreement on Apportionment solidifies the principle of equitable utilization, 
defining what the provinces view as equitable while allowing each province to use its water as 
long as the agreed-upon volumes cross the provincial borders (McCaffrey, 2007; Partners for the 
Saskatchewan River Basin, 2009b). Within the individual provinces, water allocation is dictated 
by water licenses granted by the specified licensing body within each province. The system relies 
on the clear establishment of priority, where junior license holders must give up their water 
rights to ensure that senior license holders continue to receive their allocated amounts during 
shortages. The Province of Alberta specifies the priority of water licenses. However, since 
Saskatchewan’s implementation of the Water Corporation Act in 1984, the license priorities of 
that province have been less clear. Prior to 1984, water licenses had been prioritized by types of 
water use, but those provisions were not included in the current legislation (Hurlbert, 2006). 
Unclear prioritization of water licenses may result in conflicts in Saskatchewan during times of 
water stress, ultimately resulting in significant negative effects across the basin (Hurlbert, 2009; 
McCaffrey, 2007). Although conflict resolution legislation exists, Hurlbert (2009) argues that the 
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process is time-consuming and inefficient and does not necessarily resolve the original problems 
that created the conflict.  
In addition to the Master Agreement and the licensing systems within each province, each 
province has multiple governing agencies with varying mandates and responsibilities for the 
allocation, management, and protection of provincial water resources. This shared responsibility 
has created a complex web of provincial water management. The decentralized and fragmented 
governance structure creates uncertainty about what actions would be taken across the basin in 
times of severe water shortages. 
2. Problem Statement 
Specific issues concerning future water allocation arise from the ambiguity associated 
with the current governance structure. First, questions persist regarding the ability of the 1969 
Master Agreement on Apportionment to continue to ensure the equitable use of water between 
the Prairie Provinces under increasing demand and changing climatic conditions. In particular, 
the period used to determine water apportionment for the agreement, 1912–1967, had an average 
mean annual flow higher than the 20th-century mean (Case & Macdonald, 2003). 
Second, concerns about water management persist within each province under existing 
licensing and allocation systems. These systems do not accommodate flow fluctuations and 
provide little adaptive capacity during times of basin-wide stress (Hurlbert, 2009; Hurlbert, 
Corkal, & Diaz, 2009). The drought in Alberta from 2001 to 2002 showed that, at the local level, 
some senior license holders were willing to share their allocations with junior license holders to 
sustain the local region’s economy and social equity (Gober & Wheater, 2014). Although this 
localized resilience displays the adaptive capabilities of a small number of license holders during 
a single-year drought, uncertainty remains regarding how water license holders throughout the 
basin would prioritize and allocate water over multiple years of water stress (Gober & Wheater, 
2014). 
Third, the fragmented water allocation governance structure throughout the Prairie 
Provinces raises concerns about how water actually will be allocated in times of shortage.  
Though it allows each province to be independent in its water management, this fragmentation 
may impede timely adaptation due to the bureaucratic processes of the individual governing 
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bodies. On a larger scale, this may foster a competitive relationship among the provinces over 
the region’s water resources (Bildhaeuser, 2010; Fishman, 2011; Hanak et al., 2011). 
In the context of this uncertainty about how water would be allocated in the context of 
drought and shortage, the purposes of this thesis research are (a) to use an experiment with 
regional stakeholders to explore how drought conditions and allocation rules affect allocation 
decisions; (b) to identify the social processes used to formulate decisions and policies regarding 
the sustainable use of water resources and the protection of other riparian bodies under various 
drought scenarios; and (c) to determine the priorities attached to different sectors (industry, 
agriculture, and municipalities) in times of drought and under different policy conditions.   
 
3. Method 
In this study, we designed an interactive decision-making experiment to examine how 
stakeholders allocate water resources under shortage conditions and provide evidence of whether 
their allocation patterns change under different sets of policy rules. We chose an interactive 
allocation decision-making experiment over other methods such as decision-maker and 
stakeholder interviews, focus groups, and surveys because of its ability to stimulate learning, 
mimic real life, and enable participants to interact with one another and reflect on what they 
learned from the experience. The experiment allowed stakeholders with different interests and 
values to conduct water management allocations in a safe, scenario-based exercise; forced them 
to consider allocation trade-offs in real time; and demonstrated the value of gaining a shared 
understanding of water allocation planning and decision making under uncertainty in the 
Saskatchewan River Basin (Haug, Huitema, & Wenzler, 2011; Hu, Johnston, Hemphill, 
Krishnamurthy, & Vinze, 2012). 
3.1. Participants 
Over the course of 10 workshops throughout the Saskatchewan River Basin, we engaged 
64 participants (19 from Alberta, 39 from Saskatchewan, and 6 from Manitoba) in the decision 
experiment. Research participants were recruited from the following watershed-based 
organizations: the Global Institute for Water Security, Partners for the Saskatchewan River Basin, 
Battle River Watershed Alliance, Beaver River Watershed Alliance, Red Deer River Watershed 
Alliance, South East Alberta Watershed Alliance, Association of Saskatchewan Watersheds, 
6!
South Saskatchewan River Water Stewards, North Saskatchewan River Stewards, Keepers of the 
Saskatchewan River Delta, and Manitoba Conservation and Water Stewardship. Leaders from 
these organizations discussed participation with their boards of directors. If they wished to 
participate, they circulated an electronic poster to members. Individual participants were asked to 
register in advance and were emailed a consent form. The University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioral Research Ethics Board approved the research protocol for the decision experiment.1 
3.2 Material and Apparatus 
Jesse Langstaff of the University of Saskatchewan’s Social Sciences Research 
Laboratories provided support for the design of the experiment. The theoretical design was 
formed over a great deal of discussion and trial and error regarding the choice of sectors, number 
of stages, severity of drought levels, and operationalization of the allocations system, with the 
goal of creating an experiment that was simple in its design but at the same time formed an 
accurate representation of the Saskatchewan River Basin.   
Once we finalized the theoretical design, Langstaff translated the theoretical experiment 
into code and designed its execution. We ran the experiments through the University of 
Saskatchewan’s Social Sciences Research Laboratories using the Social Sciences Research 
Laboratories’ mobile lab. We linked desktop computers (laptops and iPads for mobile labs) via 
the Software Platform for Human Interaction Experiments (SoPHIE), which allowed the 
hardware devices to be connected in multiples of three via a web interface to form our interactive 
river basin (SoPHIE, 2015). In the groupings of three, each computer represented a different 
region based on location, including A (upstream), B (midstream), or C (downstream). We 
modeled the fictional river basin after the Saskatchewan River Basin and used relevant data from 
Alberta for Region A, Saskatchewan for Region B, and Manitoba for Region C (see Fig 2). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 BEH 13-386:  Facilitated Empathy for Water Security in the Saskatchewan River Basin (SSHRC). Approved 2 
Dec 2013. 2!After piloting the experiment it was necessary to increase the demand for the environmental services sector to have 
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Fig. 2. Screenshot of the three regions in the interactive decision experiment. 
 
 We identified the sector demands across the basin using provincial licensing data for 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. To simplify the experiment’s design, we identified four 
key water-use sectors across the basin—agriculture, industry, municipal and environmental 
services—aggregating smaller sectors into each of the four sectors where we felt that they fit best 
(See Appendix A). We then created simplified, weighted water demands for each of the basin’s 
three regions, using provincial licensing data for Alberta and Manitoba and water use records for 
Saskatchewan, whose values would represent the ideal 100% flow of the basin2 (see Table 1; 
Dey, 2014; Government of Alberta, 2010; Kulshreshtha, Bogdan, & Nagy, 2012). The 
experiment also included return water flows for each sector to mimic the different levels of 
consumption for the experiment’s four sectors. The return flow percentages for each sector were 
agriculture, 0%; industry, 75%; municipal, 90%; and environmental services, 100% (AMEC, 
2009; Kulshreshtha, et al.,!2012;!Little, 2001; Martz et al., 2007; Saffran, 2005). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!After piloting the experiment it was necessary to increase the demand for the environmental services sector to have 
a large enough water demand that it would warrant larger considerations from participants when making their 
allocation decisions. The addition of environmental services demand increased the overall basin demand (See 
Appendix A). !
 
8!
!!
Table 1. Sector Water Demand and Water Point Value (Per Water Unit) for the Three Regions. 
 
We created a corresponding economic value for each of the four sectors in our fictional 
basin by looking at per-capita GDP data for the Prairie Provinces to develop a summary measure 
of the economic benefit associated with different sets of decisions (see Table 1). We divided the 
economic value of each sector in each region by its respective water demand to create a weighted 
value for each unit of water that would be allocated to the specified sector. We rounded down the 
values and referred to them as “points” (a simple variable for participants to view) during the 
experiment, allowing us to create realistic economic impacts of water allocations. We added this 
variable to reduce the incidence of participants allocating evenly to the different sectors and as a 
means of giving them an incentivised task throughout the experiment to accumulate the most 
points—this was to increase their cognitive attention to the experiment and have the allocation 
process mimic the competitive nature of the riparian relationship (Fehr & Falk, 2002). 
In addition to the four sectors to which participants could allocate, we included a fifth 
sector, hydropower, because of its importance to the economy of the Prairie Provinces (Canadian 
Hydropower Association, 2014; Hydro Quebec, 2014). However, participants could not 
specifically allocate to this sector. Rather, to simulate the economic benefits of having water run 
through hydropower stations in their regions, we awarded participants points for the amount of 
water they had at the start of their regions’ turns. By looking at the hydropower generation 
capacity in combination with the average price of electricity in each province, we created a 
weighted score for the three regions that would best represent the economic value of hydropower, 
 Region A Region B Region C 
 Demand Points Demand Points Demand Points 
Industry 29 165 3 222 15 233 
Agriculture 41 3 23 19 4 44 
Municipal 16 262 12 275 4 354 
Environmental 
Services 
25 -20 5 -20 5 -60 
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with Regions A and B receiving 20 points and Region C receiving 60 points3 per unit at the start 
of their respective turns. 
There was one exception to the hydropower allocations. When participants allocated to 
the environmental services sector, we assumed that water would not go through the region’s 
hydropower station but rather would flow downstream unobstructed, helping to maintain 
environmental flows (Edenhofer et al., 2011; Hand, et al., 2012; National Academy of Sciences, 
2010). Therefore, because water did not pass through the hydropower station, this resulted in a 
loss of points when participants allocated water units to the environmental services sector, due to 
not having a rigorous way of measuring the economic value of water allocated to the 
environment, particularly when a water quality measure was not included in the experiment.  
Participants were tested under the following three policy conditions, based on the three 
models of global water allocation (McCaffrey, 2007). Each policy condition was tested under 
two potential water levels: (a) the drier-than-average conditions of today, reflecting 81% of 
historical flows; and (b) severe drought conditions, with a 45% reduction from today’s flows. 
Policy 1: the status quo. The first policy condition test mimicked the Prairie Provinces’ 
1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment, where regions were subject to defined minimum 
flows. Starting with Region A, participants were subject to defined minimum flows and could 
use no more than 50% of their available water units, ensuring that the other half was available for 
participants in Region B. Region B would in turn be subject to the same defined minimum flow 
conditions to ensure that 50% reached Region C. 
The status quo policy condition is based on the global allocation theory of limited 
territorial sovereignty. The theory of limited territorial sovereignty is the most widely accepted 
principle of water allocation. It promotes the balanced management of water resources, whereby 
it does not mandate an equal allocation of water resources to all parties but instead promotes the 
collaboration of riparian bodies to allocate water resources fairly, depending on the water 
demand and needs of each riparian body—as long as those uses do not significantly harm or 
hinder one party’s ability to meet the needs of other riparian bodies (McCaffrey, 2007). 
Policy 2: no rule set. The second policy removed any rule set in the fictional basin. It is 
based on the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, assuming that riparian position !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Region C received a higher point total than Regions A and B because Manitoba has a substantially larger 
generating capacity in comparison with Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
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determines allocation and providing upstream riparian users with a priority and monopoly over 
water use at the expense of downstream users (Birnie, Boyle, & Redgwell, 2009; McCaffrey, 
2007).!
 Policy 3: the community of interest principle (shared risk). The third policy 
introduced the element of communication and negotiation between participants in the basin 
groups. The community of interest principle assumes that riparian bodies have an incentive to 
share the burden of management and the benefits of water resources (Birnie et al., 2009; 
McCaffrey, 2007). In introducing communication among participants in their basin groups, we 
sought to determine whether the change in experiment conditions changed how participants 
allocated their water resources. 
3.3 Procedures 
Before the experiment began, participants were divided into groups of three, with each 
participant randomly assigned a computer (laptop or iPad for mobile workshops) that would 
determine the region for which the participant would assume the role of a water manager 
responsible for the allocation of water resources to four competing sectors. We placed physical 
barriers between participants to prohibit them from seeing one another’s screens, ensuring that 
they would not be influenced by other allocations. 
The facilitator gave a brief presentation to inform participants of their roles as decision 
makers responsible for allocating water resources to competing sectors within their respective 
riparian region (e.g., upstream, midstream, or downstream) in a fictitious river basin. Participants 
were informed that there would be six stages within the experiment, each with varying water 
levels and allocation rules, and that instructions for each stage would be displayed on their 
screens prior to starting.  
We explained the experiment mechanics, including the four sectors: water demands, 
return flows, hydropower, and point return from water allocated to each sector. We informed 
participants that the each member of the basin group with the most points at the end of the 
workshop would receive a prize worth around $10–$15. Before starting the experiment, 
participants had 5 minutes to familiarize themselves with the experiment interface in a generic 
region (where all the water demands were the same), and they were informed that once the 
experiment commenced, participants could not speak to one another unless directed to do so. We 
also notified participants that each region would have 2 minutes to make its allocations. 
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Additionally, we asked participants to write out their allocation strategies for each policy and 
water level scenario on a printed questionnaire that we provided. 
Stage 1: Policy 1 (status quo)—Drier-than-average conditions of today. At the outset, 
participants’ screens informed them of the Policy 1 rule set and water level scenario, describing 
how a lower-than-average snowpack and dry weather conditions were limiting water supply.4 
Once all participants clicked “Continue” to confirm these instructions, participants in Region A 
were prompted to begin their allocations. After 2 minutes, we asked participants in Region A to 
click “Submit” to confirm their allocations. We then prompted Region B to begin their 
allocations, followed by Region C. Once Region C had completed their allocations, all 
participants saw the next set of instructions on their screens. 
Stage 2: Policy 1 (status quo)—Severe drought conditions. Still under the Policy 1 rule 
set (business-as-usual), participants were presented with the next set of conditions: after 4 years 
of drought, there was an extreme shortage of water across the river basin. Participants then 
allocated as they had done in Stage 1, accounting for the fact that the drought constrained the 
flows.  
Stage 3: Policy 2 (no rule set)—Drier-than-average conditions of today. For Policy 2, 
the facilitator informed participants of the new policy conditions (without the Master 
Agreement’s allocation scheme), and the allocation process proceeded as it had under Stages 1 
and 2. 
Stage 4: Policy 2 (no rule set)—Severe drought conditions. Still under the Policy 2 
rule set (no rule set), the facilitator presented participants with extreme shortage conditions. 
Participants then allocated as they had done in the first three stages. 
 Stage 5: Policy 3 (shared risk)—Drier-than-average conditions of today.  For Policy 
3, instructions informed participants that each group would select representatives from Regions 
A, B, and C who would have 4 minutes to discuss a basin-wide allocation strategy, thus 
introducing the element of communication and shared learning to the experiment. We recorded 
each group’s discussions via an audio recorder and used the information to assess qualitatively 
the decision process and social learning that occurred during the experiment. After the 4 minutes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 A narrative was chosen over showing participants the water level percentage in order to reduce participant’s ability 
to game the experiment and maximize points.  
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were up, participants once again could not speak to one another and went back to their individual 
computers to allocate for their regions as they had done before. 
 Stage 6: Policy 3 (shared risk)—Severe drought conditions. Still under the Policy 3 
rule set (shared risk), participants were presented with extreme shortage conditions. As in Stage 
5, participants had 4 minutes to discuss a basin-wide allocation strategy. After the 4 minutes 
were up, participants once again could not speak to one another and went back to their individual 
computers to allocate for their region as they had done before (for more detail see Appendix B). 
 Upon completion, we announced which group had the highest point score (i.e., which 
basin had grossed the highest economic value from its water allocations throughout the 
experiment) and would therefore receive the prize. Then we debriefed the participants on the 
results and facilitated an open discussion to gain some insight into what the participants had 
decided, what had driven them to make those decisions, and which policy the participants 
believed most equitably distributed water resources between the regions under both water level 
scenarios. 
4. Analytical Approach 
  This section provides an overview of the different variables used for analysis.  
a. Region: The regions (A, B, and C) simulated the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Manitoba (as discussed in Section 3.2). 
b. Policy: The three policies in the experiment dictated the rule set for the allocation rounds 
(business as usual, no rules, and communication, as discussed in Section 3.2). 
c. Water Availability: Water availability dictated how much water the basin (the three 
regions combined) would start with at the beginning of an allocation round. There were 
two allocation rounds for each policy rule set: one round at 81% water availability to 
meet the basin demand (mimicking the drier-than-average conditions of today), and 
another round at 45% water availability to meet basin demand (representing severe 
drought conditions). 
d. Water Units: These represented the basin’s water supply so that the participants could 
allocate. The analysis and results distinguished between each region’s Water Units In and 
Water Units Out. This allowed us to see how much water each region used under the 
different policies and water availabilities. 
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A) Water Units In: The number of water units with which each region would start at 
the beginning of an allocation turn. For Region A, this was always the starting 
number of water units for the basin (either 90 or 50, depending on the water 
availability level). For Regions B and C, the number of water units in the basin 
depended on how much water had been passed on from the upstream region. 
B) Water Units Out: The number of water units with which each region ended after 
their allocations to their region’s four sectors. The number of water units out for a 
particular region would be the amount of water that would be passed on to the 
downstream region. 
e. Sectors: Participants allocated to four sectors: industry, agriculture, municipal, and 
environmental services (as discussed in Section 3.2). 
f. Points: The economic value of each sector, based on its water demand, created a 
weighted value for each unit of water allocated to the specified sectors. These values 
were simplified and referred to as “points” during the experiment (as discussed in Section 
3.2; see Appendix A)!
We conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine whether significant 
differences in water allocations existed among the three different policies. We also used an 
ANOVA to determine whether significant differences in allocations existed among regions under 
the three policy rule sets and two water level scenarios. 
To address the effect of drought conditions, we conducted a one-sample t-test for Policies 
1 and 2 and an ANOVA for Policy 3 to determine the effect of water levels on points and water 
units in and out when there was 81% water availability compared with 45% water availability. 
 To address how the participants allocated water to the different sectors, we conducted a 
mean comparison and ANOVA to determine whether significant differences existed in patterns 
of allocation to different sectors under the three policies and two water level scenarios. We 
performed a qualitative analysis of participants’ allocation strategies using NVivo 10 to interpret 
the communication sessions among participants. !!
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5. Results 
 
Policy and the presence of drought conditions had statistically significant effects on 
allocation decisions. Differences between the three policies, however, were not as large as 
expected. Two factors may have contributed to this result. First, participants in the experiment 
had extensive knowledge of the Saskatchewan River Basin, including the allocation rules set by 
the 1969 Master Agreement. Additionally, participants’ prior knowledge of water allocation was 
primed by running Policy 1 (the one assuming the Master Agreement was still in place) and 
invoking participants’ existing knowledge of the issue. Even when the rules allowed them to 
vary from the Master Agreement and coordinate with other regions, many of the participants 
reproduced the allocation scheme of the status quo, passing on 50% of their available water units 
to the downstream province. The trend was supported by a large amount of qualitative data in 
which many participants reported that they had defaulted to the Master Agreement allocation 
rules.  
In addition, the experiment’s design did not incentivize individual participants to satisfy 
their particular region’s water demands. Because participants did not know the water demands of 
other regions, they were conservative and limited allocations of their region’s water units. While 
those factors affected the results, those factors also provide evidence that the trends apparent in 
the results might have greater implications in a real-world scenario.!
5.1 Policy  
Results from the decision experiment showed that Policy 2 significantly affected 
participants’ water allocation decisions under the 81% water availability scenario for water in 
(F[24,23] = 207.78, p <.001) and water out (F[32,15] = 3.65, p = .005), but it did not affect 
points (see Table 2). Policy 2 significantly affected participants’ water allocation decisions under 
the 45% water availability scenario for water in (F[18,30] = 74.35, p <.001) and water out 
(F[25,23] = 10.59, p <.001), but, again, it did not affect points (see Table 2). Policy 3 
significantly affected participants’ water allocation decisions under the 81% water availability 
scenario for water in (F[30,32] = 26.49, p <.001) and water out (F[42,20] = 5.84, p <.001) but, 
as with the other two, it did not affect points. Policy 3 significantly affected participants’ water 
allocation decisions under the 45% water availability scenario for water in (F[23,40] = 24.07, p 
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<.001) and water out (F[28,35] = 6.27, p <.001), but, in keeping with the trend, it did not affect 
points (Table 2). 
Participants’ allocation patterns under Policy 1 and Policy 3 resulted in comparable 
means for the number of water units flowing through the river basin (water units in and out of 
each region), suggesting that communication did not substantially affect allocation decisions. 
However, significant differences existed between Policy 2 and Policies 1 and 3, such as 
consistently fewer water units flowing through the river basin in Policy 2 than under Policies 1 
and 3, which resulted from a larger number of water units used for the various economic 
purposes within the basin. The increase in water units used under the Policy 2 scenarios does not, 
in itself, indicate a poor policy option, particularly if the increased water use distributes benefits 
equitably throughout the entire basin. A comparison of the three policies’ impacts on the amount 
of water entering the individual regions in the decision experiment (see Table 3) indicates that, 
under Policy 2, more water was used by Regions A and B. Policy 2’s added flexibility gave 
participants more freedom in their allocations, and without a defined allocation rule set, 
participants may have been less aware of downstream needs, resulting in an increase in water use 
for Regions A and B. This result still needs to be considered, however, in light of the fact that 
many participants in the experiment defaulted to the Master Agreement (Policy 1) allocation 
rules. Had participants in the experiment not had extensive knowledge of the Master Agreement 
allocation rules, water use for Regions A and B under Policy 2 would likely have been higher, 
resulting in even lower inflow for Region C. The experiment highlighted the inherent 
disadvantage to downstream users unless strong policies such as the Master Agreement are in 
place to protect their allocations.  
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Table 2. ANOVA for Water Allocations Based on Policy Under 81% and 45% Water 
Availability 
Water Availability 
81% 
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Points 6908.13 1878.55 7438.61 1547.57 7108.72 1899.30 
Water In 64.78** 23.53 63.55** 23.12 65.94** 22.73 
Water Out 45.60**  18.48 42.16* 15.29  46.94** 17.69 
Water Availability 
45% 
      
Points 4814.30 1679.32 5000.06 1625.72 4717.31 1805.04 
Water In 35.31** 13.11 34.31** 13.97 35.27** 13.97 
Water Out 23.41** 9.95 21.29** 9.88 23.25** 11.18 
Note. *p ≤ .010. ** p ≤ .001. Otherwise p > .050. 
 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations for Water Units into Each Region under the Three 
Policies and Two Water Availability Scenarios 
Water In Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 
Water Availability 
81% 
M SD M SD M SD 
Region A 90 0 90 0 90 0 
Region B 58.86  13.25 56.65  9.87 60.50  14.22 
Region C 39.78 15.30 37.93  10.77 43.11  15.69 
Water Availability 
45% 
   
Region A 50 0 50 0 50 0 
Region B 32.68  6.15 31.59 5.52 33.41  7.84 
Region C 20.58  6.64 17.43 5.06 19.58 8.36 
 
 Policy 2’s higher overall water consumption was evident under both the 81% and 45% 
water availability scenarios. This consumption had more impact on downstream users in the 45% 
availability (severe drought) scenario. In Policy 2’s severe drought scenario, Region C received 
3.15 fewer units than it did under Policy 1 (F[2,61] = 177.28, p <.001) and 2.15 fewer units than 
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it did under Policy 3 (F[2,61] = 116.65, p <.001). Although the gain or loss of 2.15–3.15 water 
units is relatively inconsequential—taking into account the larger water demands of Regions A 
and B—it is significant for Region C because that region’s overall water demand could be met 
with substantially less water in comparison to A and B. Therefore, the loss of 2.15–3.15 water 
units equalled enough water to fulfill 8%–11% of C’s overall water demand, a large proportion 
under severe drought conditions. Thus, under the Policy 2 scenario, the absence of a defined 
allocation rule set or element of communication between riparian regions fostered a less 
equitable water distribution pattern and had negative ramifications for the downstream region. 
 A further examination of the results showed which policy option most equitably 
distributed water throughout the basin during the severe drought scenario. Policy 1’s defined 
minimum flows resulted in the largest amount of water reaching Region C and ensured the most 
equitable distribution of water to the three regions (see Table 2). Based on these results, Policy 
1’s defined minimum flows ensured the most equitable distribution of water throughout the river 
basin under severe drought conditions. 
5.2 Policy-Specific Qualitative Findings 
Qualitative analysis of participants’ allocation strategies under the three policy scenarios 
showed that many participants anchored on the Policy 1 Master Agreement allocation style for 
all three policy scenarios. Commenting on why this was the case, one participant stated that their 
allocations under Policy 2 and 3 were “similar [to] Policy 1; even though [I] don’t need to pass 
on 50% [I] feel morally [and] ethically obligated to do so.” This comment was similar to a large 
portion of participant comments, many of which mentioned that regardless of what sectors they 
were prioritizing, they “tried to remain as close as possible to the 50% policy” A reason for this 
appeared to be many participants’ concerns with providing enough water to the downstream 
regions, with comments such as “I tried to meet provincial demands in a way that I can . . . 
deliver enough water downstream.” While the desire to pass on substantial amounts of water was 
nearly universal, participants approached it from varying perspectives, with the more pessimistic 
participants feeling the need to compensate for other regions’ lack of generosity with their 
downstream flows. One participant commented,  
No allocation rules is a bad thing. Not all regions will have a similar mindset. I think my 
upstream user has a large bias in one of the sectors, so I need to compensate in order to 
provide [a] good supply to my downstream user. 
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Other participants appeared more optimistic when equitably dividing the basin’s water resources. 
One participant commented, “Seems only fair to give downstream provinces/regions about 50% 
of what we have. It’s about the right for water/to water.” 
Under the Policy 3 scenarios, where participants in one region could communicate with 
the other regions for the first time in the experiment, many participants noted that they slightly 
altered their allocation strategies in conjunction with their group’s discussion of basin needs and 
how they each should allocate. Many participants felt that Policy 3 was the best policy option 
because of this added communication; they could equitably allocate to meet the needs of 
everyone in the basin. However, it is important to note that a number of participants in the 
experiment were aware of the fragile nature of riparian cooperation when no fixed rule set was in 
place. A downstream participant summed up this issue:  
You sure do not want to be in Region C when relations break down and those upstream 
have all control of whether or not to let you have any water. I was happy to see that 
Regions A and B left some water for us . . . in Region C. I believe we need to focus on 
those relationships and continue to work together, as it is much more important during 
“crisis” moments than when all is well on the river. 
5.3 Water Availability  
Water availability had a statistically significant effect on participants’ allocation 
decisions. Under Policy 1, drought conditions significantly affected the basin’s points total (t[62] 
= 29.19, p < .001), the number of water units in (t[62] = 21.86, p < .001), and the number of 
water units out (t[62] = 19.60, p < .001). Under Policy 2, drought conditions significantly 
affected the basin’s points total (t[48] = 33.64, p < .001), the number of water units in (t[48] = 
19.24, p < .001), and the number of water units out (t[48] = 19.30, p < .001). Under Policy 3, 
drought conditions significantly affected the basin’s number of water units in (F[2,61] = 83.91, p 
< .001) and the number of water units out (F[2,61] = 15.83, p < .001) when there was 81% water 
availability compared to 45% water availability. In the Policy 3 scenario, however, there was no 
significant effect on points (F[2,61] = 2.11, p = .131), which appears to be due to a large 
variation in how points were accumulated when participants were able to communicate.  
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Fig. 3. Percentages of basin water unit allocations to the four sectors under the three policies and 
two water availability scenarios.!
Water levels affected participants’ allocation decisions not only with regard to how much 
was used but also with regard to where it could go, particularly when the number of available 
water units was reduced. Under the 45% water availability (severe drought) scenario, participants 
tended to reduce the basin’s allocations to the agriculture sector and increase allocations to the 
municipal sector. When the number of available water units was reduced under the severe 
drought scenario, participants reduced the basin’s agricultural water allocation from an average 
of 34.86% to 31.44%. The 3.42% decrease to the agriculture sector corresponded with an 
increase in water allocated to the municipal sector, from an average of 20.36% to 24.28% of the 
basin’s water allocation. Additionally, under the severe drought scenario, participants reduced 
Sector Allocations 45% Water Availability
Policy 1
Policy 2
Policy 3
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Agriculture Environmental Services Industry Municipal
Sector Allocations 81% Water Availability
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Policy 2
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the basin’s industry allocation by 1.3% (25.43% to 24.43%) and increased allocations to the 
environmental services sectors by .79% (19.35% to 20.14%). 
The largest water use trade-off from agriculture to municipal usage warrants closer 
examination to understand the trade-off’s implications. The 3.42% decrease in the basin’s overall 
water allocations to agriculture under the severe drought scenario resulted in an average 24.17% 
decrease of the basin’s ability to satisfy the agriculture sector’s water demand. Meanwhile, the 
corresponding 3.92% increase in the basin’s overall water allocations to the municipal sector 
under the 45% water availability scenario resulted in an average decrease of 15.94% in the 
basin’s ability to satisfy the municipal sector’s water demands. This was a considerably smaller 
decrease in ability to satisfy demand compared to the decrease for the agriculture sector. 
Participants therefore used the reduction in water to the agriculture sector to ensure a 
smaller loss for the municipal sector. Looking at how this result affected the individual regions, 
we can clearly see that the three regions did not experience equal outcomes. Table 4 shows the 
average percentage of each region’s ability to satisfy sector demands under the three policies in 
both the 81% and 45% water availability scenarios. These results showed that under both water 
level scenarios, considerably less demand was met upstream compared to downstream. Two 
factors contributed to this result. First, Regions A and B had higher overall water demands, 
whereas Region C had considerably lower demands, allowing a higher ratio of its demands to be 
met with less water. Second, these results highlighted the conservative allocation by participants 
in the experiment. Many participants, particularly those situated upstream, commented that they 
would have been more generous in their allocations had they known the water demands of the 
different regions. Participants also stated that their allocation decisions would have been very 
different if an incentive or disincentive existed to provide as much water as possible to the region 
for which they were allocating.  
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Table 4. Regions’ Average Sector Water Demand Met Under the Two Water Availability Levels 
Sector Industry Agriculture Environmental 
Services 
Municipal 
Water 
Availability 
81% 45% 81% 45% 81% 45% 81% 45% 
Region A 
(Alberta) 
62% 38%% 60% 32% 66% 41% 77% 55% 
Region B 
(Saskatchewan) 
79% 66% 67% 45% 74% 65% 80% 68% 
Region C 
(Manitoba) 
83% 50% 85% 63% 81% 64% 92% 78% 
  
 Although it is unlikely that a real-world scenario would exactly duplicate the results of 
how these allocations affected each region, the trade-off implications are important. Notably, 
participants sought a trade-off of water allocations, minimizing the allocations to agriculture and 
industry and prioritizing the municipal sector under the severe drought scenario. Many 
participants viewed this trade-off as necessary to preserve social equity, the economic stability, 
and their region’s environmental integrity. 
5.5 Water Availability Key Qualitative Findings 
A qualitative analysis of the participants’ allocation strategies under the two water 
availability levels emphasized the key trade-off of agriculture to prioritize the municipal sector 
under the severe drought scenario. The majority of participants appeared to have chosen this 
trade-off because, as one participant commented, “it was the most water-demanding sector and 
had the lowest return [flow].” In turn, the majority of participants appear to have prioritized the 
municipal sector for human needs. One participant commented that they “decided to prioritize 
municipalities, specifically domestic water, as this is a life necessity.” In post-experiment 
discussions, many participants noted that their decision to allocate water to the municipal sector 
was based on human fundamental needs for water to survive. Participants almost universally 
deprioritized the agriculture sector, which had the largest water demand in the interactive basin, 
no return flow, and relatively little point return in comparison to other sectors; the majority of 
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participants believed this trade-off was necessary to better preserve the social equity, economic 
stability and environmental integrity of the river basin.  
The secondary trade-off evident from the experiment was the reduction in water allocated 
to the industrial sector. Although this reduction was less drastic than the reduction in water to the 
agriculture sector under the severe drought scenario, a word frequency analysis of participant 
allocation strategies showed that industry was the most frequently mentioned sector (mentioned 
25% more than any other sector in the 81% water availability scenario and 37% more in the 45% 
water availability scenario).  Even though industry was evidently a major consideration in 
participants’ allocation strategies, opinions and subsequent allocations to industry appeared to be 
largely divided. Some participants held that the industrial sector should be prioritized to preserve 
the economy; with participants commenting that they’re allocation strategy was to provide 
greater allocations to industry to “keep up the economy.” One participant even noted they 
“maxed out industry to keep the economy moving.” It is important to note that many participants 
who believed the industrial sector should be prioritized did express that in addition to its 
economic benefits, the industrial sector in the experiment had relatively high return flows and 
noted that greater allocations to industry would allow a higher percentage of water to be passed 
downstream.  
While a good proportion of participants evidently prioritized the industrial sector, other 
participants viewed it as nonessential during times of drought and supported reducing water 
allocations to the industrial sector. Many of the participants that reduced their allocations to the 
industrial sector appeared to believe that industry would “need to adapt” and that “[water] 
limitation[s] will drive innovation [for water conservation]”. This ideological divide resulted in 
minor changes to the percentage of water allocated to the industrial sector across the basin under 
the severe drought scenario.  
At the outset of this experiment, we were uncertain how participants would allocate water 
to the environmental services sector, particularly because they would lose points for doing so. 
Surprisingly, under both water availability scenarios, participants consistently allocated water to 
the environment. As the environmental sector had a 100% return flow, it served to ensure higher 
water flows to the downstream regions. However, participants could have chosen simply not to 
allocate to the environment, which would have resulted in the same amount of water flowing 
downstream but would not have caused a loss of points. When asked why they allocated to the 
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environment, participants had mixed responses. Some participants mentioned the sustainability 
of the water system and surrounding ecosystems, whereas other participants expressed the view 
that it was “simply the right thing to do” or felt they were morally obligated to allocate to the 
environment. Although there were no obvious benefits to the participants to allocate to the 
environment, they did so anyway; we can extrapolate that allocations to this sector would have 
been greater had we assigned positive points to environmental services.  
6. Discussion 
Although policies affected the difference between participant allocation patterns less than 
we expected at the outset of the experiment, the results yielded insight into the effects of rule 
structures for managing a scarce resource such as water. Significantly, water was more equitably 
distributed throughout the river basin under Policies 1 (status quo) and 3 (community of interest) 
than under Policy 2 (no rules) in the decision experiment. This implies that when there is a 
defined minimum flow rule set or when riparian users communicate well, water will be more 
equitably distributed than in a scenario where the rules of allocation are unclear and 
communication and coordination are not present. This result is consistent with the current water 
allocation theories on which we based the policies tested in this experiment (Cascao & Zeitoun, 
2010; McCaffery, 2007; McIntyre, 2010; Versteeg, 2007). 
In the 81% water availability scenario, Policy 3 most equitably distributed water 
throughout the river basin—slightly (though significant statistically) outperforming Policy 1. In 
this scenario, nearly all participants expressed the belief that Policy 3 was the most equitable 
policy option. Participants believed that coming together as a basin group to share information, 
discuss one another’s needs, and agree on the necessary trade-offs ensured the most equitable 
distribution of water between the three regions. The elements of communication and riparian 
partnership, seen in the results under Policy 3, are consistent with the current literature, 
supporting the theory that these elements are critical to forming the community of interest 
principle, which is the ideal allocation theory for water management (Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010; 
McCaffery, 2007; McIntyre, 2010; Versteeg, 2007). Respect for and consideration of one 
another’s interests, manifested through the principles of prior notification, consultation, and 
negotiation concerning changes in the use of water resources, are key to maintaining the 
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relationship between riparian bodies (Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010; Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & 
Mete, 2002; McCaffery, 2007).  
It must be remembered, however, that the results noted above were created under 
fictitious experimental conditions and many of the participants already had good working 
relationships. They also had the incentive to work together despite acting individually to allocate 
water resources to their specified region (Mercer, 2005; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). We may 
assume that if participants were given individual incentives to provide as much water as possible 
to their respective regions and had perceived different levels of gains or losses as a result, the 
incentive to work with the other riparian bodies would have been diluted, changing the 
relationship between participants (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Mercer, 2005; Thaler & Sunstein, 
2009). In turn, the community of interest principle might then have lacked the elements 
necessary to succeed, making it difficult to replicate the results of this decision experiment. 
Essentially, the process may not work in real life as it did in the experiment because factors are 
involved that we could not simulate here. 
The same assumptions of change in allocation patterns can be made when we consider 
the effects of policy on participants’ allocation decisions under the severe drought scenario. 
Although Policy 1 ensured the most equitable distribution of water throughout the basin, the 
majority of participants, who were unaware of the actual results at the time, expressed the view 
that, even under the severe drought scenario, they believed that Policy 3 most equitably 
distributed water throughout the river basin. They also highlighted that the element of 
communication was an integral factor in making decisions under the severe drought scenario 
because it allowed them to better understand one another’s individual needs and priorities and 
therefore make the necessary trade-offs. However, we may again assume that if participants had 
had individual incentives that altered their perception of gain or loss, the results seen under 
Policy 3 would be difficult to replicate. Because the number of available water units in this 
scenario was reduced dramatically, participants would probably manifest a greater concern for 
their individual regions’ well-being and would be likely to allocate more water to their own 
regions to attempt to offset a sense of loss or deprivation. 
In comparison, the defined minimum flow rule set in Policy 1 would be more resilient to 
changes in participant relationships and differing incentives. As long as the defined minimum 
flow rule is upheld, each region is ensured an equitable share of the available water. As a result, 
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in severe drought scenarios, a defined minimum flow rule set appears vital for ensuring the 
equitable distribution of water resources; in addition, it is more resilient against a variety of 
factors that affect decision-making (Cascao & Zeitoun, 2010; Lubell et al., 2002; McCaffery, 
2007).  
These results clearly demonstrate that policies containing provisions with a defined 
minimum flow rule set are useful to ensure a baseline for the equitable distribution of water. 
Additionally, these results show the potential benefits riparian bodies can gain from greater 
cooperation and communication, indicating that the optimal policy option contains provisions 
with defined minimum flow but also mandates communication and cooperation among riparian 
bodies. These findings are consistent with Lubell et al.’s (2002) conclusions that, as water 
stakeholders begin to realize that cooperation between riparian users may be less costly than lack 
of cooperation, partnerships are more likely to emerge. However, for these partnerships to be 
successful, effective regulation must be in place to guide the actions of those involved (Cascao & 
Zeitoun, 2010; Lubell et al., 2002). 
This examination of the effects of policy on participant allocations provides insight for 
stakeholders and decision makers in the Saskatchewan River Basin into how different policies 
affect allocation decisions and what policy or policy combination may be most optimal for the 
equitable distribution of water under normal and drought conditions. First, the experiment’s 
results showed the effectiveness of the 1969 Master Agreement of Apportionment rule set, 
particularly for maintaining the equitable distribution of water to the individual provinces during 
drought conditions. The experiment clarified the functionality and benefits of this agreement, 
with results matching that of the actual Master Agreement’s effectiveness since its inception in 
1969. However, some question exists regarding whether the results seen under the severe 
drought scenario would also occur in reality. Despite the agreement’s inception in 1969, it has 
rarely been significantly tested; the main exception was the drought in 2001, when Alberta came 
close to breaching the Master Agreement by nearly failing to pass the agreed-upon volume of 
water to Saskatchewan (Gober & Wheater, 2014; Wandel, Young & Smit, 2009). Considering 
that that near-breach occurred within what was a relatively short drought, there is concern and 
uncertainty about how resilient the Master Agreement would be during prolonged drought 
conditions in the future. 
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In this experiment, it was impossible for the participants to breach the Master Agreement 
rules—something that could certainly happen in reality. What each of the three provinces would 
actually do under extreme drought conditions can be predicted only by their past actions under 
similar conditions or through experimental exercises such as the one discussed in this and other 
studies (Fishman, 2011; Wandel et al., 2009). Water managers in the Saskatchewan River Basin 
must consider what actions they might take in scenarios more severe than what has been seen in 
the past. Water managers should review provisions and consider what actions they could take if 
the Master Agreement were to be breached and fashion a relevant timeline for enabling these 
processes. Current provisions within the Master Agreement mandate that the Federal Court of 
Canada determine any dispute, pointing to an uncertain and timely resolution strategy; pre-
emptively considering new resolution provisions could limit the possible negative effects of a 
breach in the agreement (Hurlbert, 2009; Lempert & Schlesinger, 2000). 
The results of the decision experiment also indicated that greater cooperation and 
communication among riparian bodies may ensure equitable allocation of water. In reality, 
however, adequate communication appears to be a practice with which many riparian bodies 
struggle, leading to less effective and efficient water management. The complex nature of water 
management is a major factor hindering effective communication among riparian bodies. 
Because water is used in so many different ways, it is hard enough for individual riparian bodies 
to understand and judiciously act on their own needs, let alone to express those needs to other 
riparian bodies while simultaneously attempting to balance the needs and wishes of other bodies 
(Fishman, 2011). Although the Prairie Provinces are generally entitled to manage their provincial 
water resources individually, the management structure of water usage is fragmented by the 
multiple governing agencies within each province, each with varying mandates and 
responsibilities for the allocation, management, and protection of water resources (Partners for 
the Saskatchewan River Basin, 2009b). This complex web of managerial bodies throughout the 
Prairie Provinces makes it difficult to establish and maintain fluid communication between 
organizations and, on a larger scale, may foster a competitive relationship among the Prairie 
Provinces over water use (Fishman, 2011). 
Fluid communication, however, is immensely beneficial. In fact, the majority of 
experiment participants expressed surprise at how much easier their task became when they were 
permitted to communicate. In the experiment debrief, many participants stated that the 
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experiment made them realize the importance of communication with other regions, enabling 
more effective basin-level water management and more efficient decision-making, particularly 
under severe drought conditions.  
The fragmented managerial structure that exists within the Prairie Provinces poses a 
challenge to the effective management and protection of water resources. However, as 
considering the human dimension of water management becomes more strategic, we have cause 
for optimism (Fishman, 2011; Gober et al., 2015). Studies such as this experiment or other 
workshops and activities may help to build a stronger relationship among water stakeholders and 
decision makers across the Prairie Provinces, which in turn can help create more effective and 
efficient water management policies (Hill et al., 2014; Rusca, Heun, & Schwartz, 2012). These 
stronger relationships will be particularly valuable under drought conditions, when better 
cooperation and communication will allow for the creation of more adaptive management plans 
that can be implemented in advance of drought situations. By planning ahead, we can reduce the 
amount of crisis-condition decision making while ensuring that we achieve the most equitable 
balance of water allocation to meet the needs of the region and population. 
The experimental results have important implications for the Saskatchewan River Basin 
and the Prairie Provinces. This decision experiment shed light on what stakeholders and decision 
makers within the Saskatchewan River Basin might prioritize during times of severe drought 
conditions and provided examples of trade-offs used to manage water under such conditions. 
Results seen in the decision experiment mimicked the actions taken in Alberta in 2001, providing 
evidence of consistent behaviour in drought conditions in the prairies (Gober & Wheater, 2014; 
Wandel et al., 2009). These results could contribute to the development of more adaptive 
management practices, reducing the uncertainty of stakeholders’ and decision makers’ actions 
during times of water stress. Additionally, these results could assist Saskatchewan in clarifying 
water license priorities, including stakeholders from the provinces in an effort to communicate 
clearly as well as allow interested parties to share their concerns and priorities (Hurlbert, 2006, 
2009). In turn, this may help reduce conflicts among stakeholders and help create better 
measures to deal with possible water shortages in the future. 
This innovative decision experiment provided insight into the effects of policy on water 
allocation decisions and clarified participant priorities during times of shortage. However we 
must note that the experiment was imperfect and presented a number of limitations that must be 
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considered. First, we found that participants anchored on the 1969 Master Agreement of 
Apportionment allocation style for all of their allocations, which minimized the difference in 
allocation patterns for the different policy treatments. In the future, running the “no rule set” 
scenario first may be a better option, giving participants an opportunity to allocate with less of an 
anchoring mechanism in place.  
Second, incentives were too low to have a significant impact on how the majority of 
participants allocated their water resources in the decision experiment. Moreover, having a group 
incentive makes participants very conservative with their allocations; they also worked together 
far better than outside riparian users might. Offering greater incentives to the individual regions 
within each basin would likely change how participants allocate water resources, better 
simulating real-world economics.  
Third, the decision experiment intentionally excluded a water quality measure for the 
purpose of reducing the experiment’s complexity. The majority of participants commented that 
their decisions would have been slightly different had there been some type of water quality 
meter or narrative of consequence. It would therefore be valuable to add a water quality element 
to a second variation to observe its effect on participant allocation patterns. !
7. Conclusion 
In summary, this decision experiment evaluated the effects of policy context and drought 
conditions on water allocation decision making in the Saskatchewan River Basin. Our results 
displayed the effectiveness of policies with defined minimum flows and communication among 
stakeholders. Participants made expected choices to protect municipal water use at the expense 
of agriculture, and to a smaller extent industry, in the face of water shortage conditions.   
Results should be interpreted with caution because participants were in no way chosen 
randomly. They had considerable experience with the problem at hand, and while the actual 
differences between policy and drought treatments were statistically significant, they were still 
relatively small. However, the results demonstrated that insight can be gained from experiments 
of this sort and that valuable social learning can occur. They also suggested the importance of 
preparing for drought conditions by implementing both a formal rule structure to oversee 
allocations or ongoing communications processes that allow difficult problems to be resolved.  
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Although the experiment was far from perfect, it could offer insight into possible 
applications in the future and could also be adapted to mimic nearly any river basin, provided the 
number of riparian bodies is known and the key water use sectors and estimated water use or 
licensed allocation of those sectors can be identified. This decision experiment has the potential 
for use by other water managers or stakeholders to gain insight into a variety of water 
management questions, which could contribute to the adaptive capacity of stakeholders and 
decision makers and assist with water management and planning under uncertain conditions. 
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Table A1. Baseline of water units each sector receives at maximum water flow and corresponding point value per water unit. 
 
† Data based on water use percentages (Table A2). Exact percentages were modified slightly to create a simple working model. 
‡ Data based on return flow percentages. 
§ Data based on Labour Force Per Capita GDP (Table A3). 
¶ Environmental services water demands were modified outside of the proportional calculations for the other sectors and 
corresponding GDP scores. This was because the additional environmental sectors’ water demand was outside the licensing or water 
use data and the environmental services and hydropower sectors had their own relationship for how points were accumulated in the 
experiment. (Table A5).
 
 Units† 
Units Passed 
On‡ Baseline Per Capita GDP 
Points (per water 
unit)§ 
Region A - Agriculture 41 0 41 $1,176.25 $28.69 $2.87 3 
Region A - Municipal 16 14 16 $41,923.55 $2,620.22 $262.02 262 
Region A - Industrial 29 22 29 $47,715.69 $1,645.37 $164.54 165 
Region A -  
Environmental  25 25 25 $2,004.99 $80.20 $8.02 -20¶ 
Total 111 61 111     
Region B - Agriculture 23 0 23 $4,429.04 $192.57 $19.26 19 
Region B - Municipal 12 10.8 12 $32,994.97 $2,749.58 $274.96 275 
Region B - Industrial 3 2.25 3 $36,645.20 $12,215.07 $1,221.51 1222 
Region B - 
Environmental 5 5 5 $2,378.07 $475.61 $47.56 -20¶ 
Total 55 18.05 43     
Region C - Agriculture 4 0 4 $1,778.52 $444.63 $44.46 44 
Region C - Municipal 4 3.6 4 $14,169.01 $3,542.25 $354.23 354 
Region C - Industrial 15 11.25 15 $35,006.16 $2,333.74 $233.37 233 
Region C - 
Environmental 5 5 5 $2,353.84 $470.77 $47.08 -60¶ 
Total 28 19.85 28     
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Table A2. Water use percentages by sector. 
Region Upstream† Midstream‡ Downstream§ 
Agriculture 44.3 56.3 15 
Municipal 17.3 30.6 14 
Industrial 31.9 8.1 64 
Environmental Services 6.5 5 7 
Total (%) 100 100 100 
† Licensing data from Government of Alberta. (2010). Facts about water in Alberta, Edmonton, 
AB.     Retrieved from: http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/6364.pdf 
 
‡ Because accurate licensing data for Saskatchewan were absent, the authors used Saskatchewan 
water use records in combination with licensing data from Alberta and Manitoba to create water 
use percentages for the Midstream region. 
Water use data from Kulshreshtha, S., Bogdan, A., & Nagy, C. (2012). Present and future water 
demand in Saskatchewan—A summary by river basins. Saskatoon, SK: University of 
Saskatchewan. 
Licensing data from Government of Alberta. (2010). Facts about water in Alberta, Edmonton, 
AB. Retrieved from: http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/6364.pdf Dey, A. K. (2014). 
Surface water licensing, water using licensing section. Province of Manitoba. Personal 
Communication. 
Additionally, data from Alberta’s Water License Allocation Viewer were used. Retrieved from 
http://esrd.alberta.ca/water/programs-and-services/south-saskatchewan-river-basin-water-
information/water-allocation-licence-viewer.aspx 
 
§ Licensing data from Dey, A. K. (2014). Surface water licensing, water using licensing section. 
Province of Manitoba. Personal Communication. 
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Table A3. Provincial GDP and corresponding Per Capita GDP by experiment sector. 
† Labour Force Population September 2014. Source: Statistics Canada. Table 282-0087 – Labour force survey estimates, seasonally 
adjusted and unadjusted, CANSIM (database).  
‡ Sector Per Capita GDP = (Sector GDP/ Province Population). 
 Alberta Saskatchewan 792,745.00 
Manitoba 
925,040.00 Population† 2,818,960.00 
 GDP 
Per Capita 
GDP‡ GDP 
Per Capita 
GDP‡ GDP 
Per Capita 
GDP‡ 
Agriculture $3,315,800,000 $1,176.25 $3,511,100,000 $4,429.04 $1,645,200,000 $1,778.52 
Municipal $118,180,800,000 $41,923.55 $26,156,600,000 $32,994.97 $13,106,900,000 $14,169.01 
Industrial $134,508,600,000 $47,715.68 $29,050,300,000 $36,645.20 $32,382,100,000 $35,006.16 
Environmental 
Services $5,652,000,000 $2,004.99 $1,885,200,000 $2,378.07 $2,177,400,000 $2,353.84 
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Table A4. Provincial gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by sector and industry. Annual (2010) (Dollars x 1,000,000) 
Experiment 
Sectors Sectors Alberta % Saskatchewan % Manitoba % 
Agriculture 
Crop/animal production  $3,129.40  1.20  $3,428.20  5.66  $1,588.90  3.22 
Support activities for agriculture and 
forestry  $184.10  0.07  $80.10  0.13  $49.90  0.10 
Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping  $2.30  0.001  $2.80  0.00  $6.40  0.01 
Industry 
Forestry and logging  $318.10  0.12  $43.20  0.07  $21.00  0.04 
Transportation and warehousing  $10,866.90  4.15  $2,803.70  4.63  $2,791.10  5.66 
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas  $63,460.90  24.25  $15,295.70  25.24  $1,974.50  4.00 
Residential construction  $5,351.60  2.05  $864.10  1.43  $819.50  1.66 
Non-residential building construction  $2,736.90  1.05  $663.00  1.09  $456.50  0.93 
Engineering construction  $14,273.10  5.45  $2,257.70  3.73  $1,230.80  2.50 
Repair construction  $2,342.70  0.90  $696.50  1.15  $704.90  1.43 
Other activities of the construction 
industry  $482.10  0.18  $33.20  0.05  $61.00  0.12 
Manufacturing  $18,348.50  7.01  $3,499.50  5.77  $5,047.60  10.24 
Utilities  $3,855.20  1.47  $1,205.90  1.99  $1,202.60  2.44 
Municipal 
Wholesale trade  $11,274.40  4.31  $2,895.10  4.78  $2,801.10  5.68 
Retail Trade  $11,720.00  4.48  $2,645.70  4.37  $2,794.00  5.67 
Information and cultural industries  $6,480.90  2.48  $1,076.40  1.78  $1,534.30  3.11 
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and 
leasing, and holding companies  $21,641.60  8.27  $4,037.10  6.66  $5,006.30  10.15 
Owner occupied dwellings  $16,406.30  6.27  $4,137.10  6.83  $4,199.00  8.52 
Professional, scientific, and technical 
services  $14,134.90  5.40  $1,477.80  2.44  $1,442.50  2.93 
Administrative and support, waste 
management, and remediation services  $5,745.00  2.20  $689.60  1.14  $820.60  1.66 
Educational services  $339.60  0.13  $38.00  0.06  $48.50  0.10 
Health care and social assistance  $5,343.40  2.04  $919.10  1.52  $1,206.50  2.45 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation  $1,089.80  0.42  $309.40  0.51  $304.90  0.62 
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Accommodation and food services  $5,104.20  1.95  $984.30  1.62  $931.60  1.89 
Other services (except public 
administration)  $4,115.20  1.57  $697.30  1.15  $669.20  1.36 
Non-profit institutions serving households  $2,115.50  0.81  $528.90  0.87  $884.10  1.79 
Government Education Services  $9,595.60  3.67  $2,690.90  4.44  $2,654.80  5.38 
Government health services  $5,928.00  2.27  $2,047.60  3.38  $2,355.30  4.78 
Other federal government services  $3,043.90  1.16  $1,056.60  1.74  $1,750.90  3.55 
Other municipal government services  $6,060.30  2.32  $1,163.30  1.92  $1,136.10  2.30 
Other aboriginal government services  $514.80  0.20  $450.20  0.74  $639.80  1.30 
Environmental 
Services 
Other provincial and territorial 
government services  $5,652.00  2.16  $1,885.20  3.11  $2,177.40  4.42 
 Total 261,657.20 100.00 60,603.20 100.00 49,311.60 100.00 
40!
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Table A5. Hydropower installed capacity and average price by province. 
Province Installed Capacity (kW)† Average Price April 2014 ($/kWh)‡ 
Alberta 909,000 10.78 
Saskatchewan 854,000 10.49 
Manitoba 5,029,000 35.71 
† Canadian Hydropower Association. (2014). Report of activities. Retrieved from 
https://canadahydro.ca/system/resources/.../CHA-AR13-e-v5-web.pdf:  
‡ Data from Hydro Quebec. (2014). Comparison of electricity prices in major North American 
cities. Retrieved from http://www.hydroquebec.com/publications/en/corporate-
documents/comparaison-electricity-prices.html 
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Appendix B 
(Step-By-Step Guide Through Decision Experiment)
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Step-By-Step Guide Through Decision Experiment 
Figures will be numbered showing experiment stage and step within the stage. Example, Figure 
1.1 represents stage 1, step one; Figure 1.2 represents stage 1, step 2; and so on.  
Fig. 1.1. Task Instructions 
 
Fig. 1.2. Example experiment interface. Participants had 5 minutes to familiarize themselves 
with the experiment interface using generic Region X (all the water demands were the same). 
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Fig. 1.3. Participants were given instructions for stage one (Policy 1 – status quo—Drier-than-
average conditions of today) 
 
Fig. 1.4. After all participants read the instructions and clicked continue, participants in Region 
A were prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions B and C were notified to wait. (Note 
that in the Policy 1 scenario the grey boxes in the outflow box represent the minimum flow of 
water that must be passed on to the next region.) 
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Fig. 1.5. Participants in Region A allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region A were instructed to click Submit.
 
Fig. 1.6. Participants in Region B were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and C were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 1.7. Participants in Region B allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region B were instructed to click Submit. 
Fig. 1.8. Participants in Region C were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and B were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 1.9. Participants in Region C allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region C were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 2.0. Participants were given instructions for stage two (Policy 1 – status quo—Severe 
drought conditions). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. After all participants read the instructions and clicked continue, participants in Region 
A were prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions B and C were notified to wait. (Note 
that in the Policy 1 scenario the grey boxes in the outflow box represent the minimum flow of 
water that must be passed on to the next region.) 
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Fig. 2.2. Participants in Region A allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region A were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 2.3. Participants in Region B were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and C were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 2.4. Participants in Region B allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region B were instructed to click Submit.
 
Fig. 2.5. Participants in Region C were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and B were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 2.6. Participants in Region C allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region C were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 3.0. Participants were given instructions for stage three (Policy 2 – no rule set—Drier-than-
average conditions of today). 
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Fig. 3.1. After all participants read the instructions and clicked continue, participants in Region 
A were prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions B and C were notified to wait.  
 
Fig. 3.2. Participants in Region A allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region A were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 3.3. Participants in Region B were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and C were notified to wait. 
 
Fig. 3.4. Participants in Region B allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region B were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 3.5. Participants in Region C were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and B were notified to wait. 
 
Fig. 3.6. Participants in Region C allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region C were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 4.0. Participants were given instructions for stage four (Policy 2 – no rule set—Severe 
drought conditions). 
 
Fig. 4.1. After all participants read the instructions and clicked continue, participants in Region 
A were prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions B and C were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 4.2. Participants in Region A allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region A were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 4.3. Participants in Region B were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and C were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 4.4. Participants in Region B allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region B were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 4.5. Participants in Region C were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and B were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 4.6. Participants in Region C allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region C were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 5.0. Participants were given instructions for stage five (Policy 3 – shared risk—Drier-than-
average conditions of today). 
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Fig. 5.1. After all participants read the instructions and clicked continue, participants in Region 
A were prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions B and C were notified to wait. 
 
Fig. 5.2. Participants in Region A allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region A were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 5.3. Participants in Region B were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and C were notified to wait. 
 
Fig. 5.4. Participants in Region B allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region B were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 5.5. Participants in Region C were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and B were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 5.6. Participants in Region C allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region C were instructed to click Submit. 
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Fig. 6.0. Participants were given instructions for stage six (Policy 3 – shared risk—Severe 
drought conditions). 
 
Fig. 6.1. After all participants read the instructions and clicked continue, participants in Region 
A were prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions B and C were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 6.2. Participants in Region A allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region A were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 6.3. Participants in Region B were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and C were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 6.4. Participants in Region B allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region B were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 6.5. Participants in Region C were then prompted to begin their allocations, while Regions 
A and B were notified to wait. 
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Fig. 6.6. Participants in Region C allocated their water units. When satisfied with their 
allocations after two minutes, participants in Region C were instructed to click Submit. 
 
Fig. 6.7. After Region C clicked submit, participants were notified that they had completed the 
experiment. 
 
 
 
